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Abstract
A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall ￿rst agree on how to allocate
its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-
rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is
eﬃcient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room
whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.
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11 Introduction
A group of friends rent a house and they shall allocate its rooms and share the rent. Alterna-
tively a group of friends consider renting a house but they shall ￿rst agree on how to allocate its
rooms and share the rent. They will rent the house only if they can ￿nd a room assignment-rent
division which appeals to each of them.
In this paper we propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems
which mimics the market mechanism. In order to do that, a key ￿rst step is formulating
a notion of an overdemand. A well-known result in discrete mathematics -Hall￿s Theorem-
provides an important hint concerning how this shall be done. Hall￿s Theorem suggests that
t h er o o mm a r k e tc l e a r sa tp r i c ep if and only if for any group of agents the number of diﬀerent
rooms collectively demanded by the group is no less than the size of the group. Motivated by
Hall￿s Theorem, Demange, Gale & Sotomayor [1986] de￿ne a set Q of objects to be minimally
overdemanded at price p if (i) the number of agents demanding only objects in Q at price p is
greater than the number of objects in Q and (ii) no strict subset of Q has the same property.
Demange, Gale & Sotomayor [1986] introduce this notion in the context of a closely related
two-sided matching market and for their purposes it is suﬃcient to ￿nd an arbitrary minimally
overdemanded set of objects. We, on the other hand, need to construct the entire set of
overdemanded rooms and merely considering minimally overdemanded sets do not suﬃce. We
iteratively apply Demange, Gale & Sotomayor idea in order to ￿nd the f u l ls e to fo v e r d e m a n d e d
rooms.
Once the full set of overdemanded rooms is formulated the rest is an application of the
well-known t￿tonnement procedure: We initially set the prices equal and ￿nd the full set of
overdemanded rooms. If it is empty then the procedure stops, each agent is assigned a room
in her demand and she pays an even share of the rent. Otherwise we continuously increase
prices of all rooms in the full set of overdemanded rooms and continuously decrease prices of
remaining rooms such that
(i) prices of all rooms in the full set of overdemanded rooms are increased at the same rate,
(ii) prices of all remaining rooms are decreased at the same rate, and
(iii) summation of prices stay constant at rent.
(Note that unless the full set of overdemanded rooms consists of half of the rooms, the rate
of increase in prices of overdemanded rooms is diﬀerent than the rate of decrease in remaining
rooms.) At each instant the full set of overdemanded rooms is calculated using the updated
prices and the price of a room increases at a given instant if and only if the room is overdemanded
at that instant. The procedure stops when the full set of overdemanded rooms is empty, each
2agent is assigned a room in her demand and she pays the ￿nal price of her assignment. We
refer this t￿tonnement procedure as the continuous-price auction.
The only instances that are crucial in the continuous price auction are those when some
agent￿s demand set changes. It is only at those instances the full set of overdemanded rooms
may change. We can analytically derive these instances using individual valuations and this
observation allows us to formulate an equivalent discrete-price auction.
While our auction is dynamic, to be realistic for its real-life consumption it is more appro-
priate to interpret it as a sealed-bid auction where each agent reports her valuations for the
rooms and a computer determines a room assignment together with a rent division via our
auction.
Our continuous-price auction (or its discrete equivalent) can be useful only if it converges.
Throughout the paper we assume that individual utilities are quasi-linear in prices and in
Theorem 1 we show that our discrete-price auction (and hence our continuous-price auction
as well) converges. We prove this result by showing that the summation of indirect utilities
strictly decreases at each step of the discrete-price auction until it converges to a feasible level
in ￿nite steps.
Recently Brams & Kilgour [2001] and Haake, Raith & Su [2001] introduce other mecha-
nisms for room assignment-rent division problems. So why shall one care for one additional
mechanism? All three mechanisms are eﬃcient so one cannot compare these mechanisms based
on eﬃciency. Envy-freeness is widely considered the central notion of fairness in the context of
room assignment-rent division problems. It can also be interpreted as a stability requirement
s i n c ei ti sd i ﬃcult to sustain envious allocations in real-life applications. In such situations
there are agents who are eager to pay more than their occupants for some of the rooms. If the
h o u s ei sn o tr e n t e dy e t ,i tw i l lm o s tl i k e l yn o tb er e n t e du n l e s st h ea g e n t sa g r e eo na ne n v y - f r e e
allocation. Based on these points we believe envy-freeness is essential for room assignment-rent
division problems. In addition to envy-freeness, a mechanism should charge a non-negative
price to each of the rooms for otherwise agents who are having a positive share of the rent
will bene￿t by leaving the negative priced rooms empty. Unfortunately there exists situations
where these two essential objectives cannot be met simultaneously. That is, there exists sit-
uations where at least one of the rooms has a negative price at each envy-free allocation. In
these situations no matter what allocation is chosen someone will be upset. If agents have not
a l r e a d yr e n t e dt h eh o u s e ,t h e yw i l le i t h e rn o tr e n ti to rt h e yw i l ln o tr e n ti ta l t o g e t h e r .
Brams & Kilgour [2001] observe this diﬃculty and they propose a mechanism which always
charges a non-negative price to each of the rooms. A diﬃculty with their mechanism is that its
outcome may be envious even in problems where there exists envy-free allocations with non-
negative prices. Haake, Raith & Su [2001], on the other hand, propose an envy-free mechanism
but a diﬃculty with their mechanism is that it may charge negative prices to some of the rooms
3even in problems where there exists envy-free allocations with non-negative prices. Our auction
mechanism is envy-free (Corollary 1) and it charges each room a non-negative price unless there
exists no envy-free allocation with non-negative prices (Theorem 2). We obtain this result by
relating our auction to the well-known Demange, Gale & Sotomayor [1986] exact auction that
yields the buyer-optimal competitive price for a related class of two-sided matching markets.
There are two additional papers which are closely related to our paper. Alkan, Demange &
Gale [1991] and Su [1999] analyze the structure of envy-free allocations for room-assignment-
rent division problems. In addition Svensson [1983], Maskin [1987], Tadenuma & Thomson
[1991], Aragones [1995] and Klijn [2000] analyze a closely related fair division problem where a
number of indivisible goods together with some money shall be fairly allocated to a number of
agents. Envy-freeness play the key role in each of these papers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the model. In Section
3 we formulate the notion of the full set of overdemanded rooms and introduce our continuous-
price auction as well as its discrete equivalent. In Section 4 we show that our auction converges
a n di nS e c t i o n5w es h o wt h a ti ti se ﬃcient, envy-free and individually rational. In Section 6
we relate our auction to Demange, Gale & Sotomayor exact auction and show that our auction
yields non-negative prices whenever there exists envy-free allocations with non-negative prices.
Finally we conclude in Section 7.
2 The Model
A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall ￿rst agree on how to allocate its rooms
and share the rent. Formally a room assignment-rent division problem is a four-tuple
hI,R,V,ci where
1. I = {i1,...,i n} is a set of agents,
2. R = {r1,...,r n} is a set of rooms,
3. U =[ ui]i∈I is a utility function vector where ui : R ￿ R → R denotes the utility function
of agent i where utility of agent i for room r at price pr is given by ui(r,pr).
4. c ∈ R++ is the rent of the house.
Pick agent i and room r. We will assume that ui(r,pr) is strictly decreasing in pr and
diﬀerentiable in pr. We denote derivative of ui(r,pr) at pr by ui0(r,pr). We will assume
that ui0(r,pr) is continuous and decreasing in pr and ui0(r,pr) <M<0 for some M,i . e .
bounded away from zero.
4We assume that (?????????????)
P
r∈R
ui(r,0) + c ≥ c max
r∈R,pr∈R
|ui0(r,pr)| for each agent i ∈ I.
Note that if this assumption fails for an agent that means the agent does not think that the
house is worth the rent and hence it is not unreasonable to assume that such an agent will not
rent the house. Throughout the paper we ￿xap r o b l e m .
A matching ￿ is an assignment of rooms to agents such that each agent is assigned one
and only one room. Let ￿i denote the room assignment of agent i under ￿ and let M denote
the set of matchings.
A price is a vector p ∈ Rn. Ap r i c ep is feasible if
P
r∈R









denote the set of feasible prices.
An allocation is a matching-feasible price pair (￿,p) ∈ M￿P.H e r ea g e n ti ∈ I is assigned
room ￿i and her share of the rent is p￿i.
We assume that ui =0is the reservation utility for each agent and it corresponds to the
utility of outside options.
3A M a r k e t A p p r o a c h
How shall one determine an allocation for a given problem? In this paper we propose an auction
which mimics the market mechanism.
G i v e na na g e n ti ∈ I and a price p ∈ Rn,d e ￿ne the demand of agent i at price p as
Di(p)={r ∈ R : ui(r,pr) ≥ ui(s,ps) for all s ∈ R}.
Let D(p)=( Di(p))i∈I denote the list of individual demands at price p.
G i v e na na g e n ti ∈ I and a price p ∈ Rn,d e ￿ne the indirect utility of agent i at price p
as
e ui(p)=m a x
r∈R
ui(r,pr)
Given a price vector p ∈ Rn,w h e nc a nw e￿nd a matching which assigns each agent a room
in her demand? The answer of this question is given by Hall [1935].
Hall￿s Theorem: Let p ∈ Rn. There exists a matching ￿ ∈ M with ￿i ∈ Di(p) for each i ∈ I
if and only if
∀J ⊆ I
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ∪
i∈J
Di(p)
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ≥ |J|
5Hall￿s Theorem suggests that the room market clears at price p if and only if the cardinality
of the union of demands of any group of agents is at least as big as the size of the group. Hall￿s
Theorem is key to de￿ne the set of overdemanded rooms at price p.
3.1 Overdemanded Rooms
Motivated by Hall￿s Theorem and following Demange, Gale & Sotomayor [1986] de￿ne a set of
rooms to be overdemanded at price p if the number of agents demanding only rooms in this
set is greater than the number of the rooms in the set. Formally S ⊂ R is overdemanded if
|{i ∈ I : Di(p) ⊆ S}| > |S|.N o t et h a tt h i sd e ￿nition allows a room to be overdemanded even
though it is not demanded by any agent. For example suppose Di(p)=Dj(p)=Dk(p)={s}.
Clearly the singleton {s} is an overdemanded set. The diﬃculty is that {s,r} is overdemanded
as well for any r ∈ R regardless of the demands. This observation motivates the following
de￿nition: A set of rooms is a minimal overdemanded set if it is overdemanded and none
of its proper subsets is overdemanded.
Demange, Gale & Sotomayor [1986] introduce these de￿nitions in the context of multi-
unit auctions and at each step of their auction they increase prices of objects in an arbitrary
minimal overdemanded set by one unit. Since prices of the rooms shall add up to rent in the
present context, we will increase prices of all ￿excessively demanded￿ rooms simultaneously
and reduce prices of the remaining rooms. As the following example shows merely considering
minimal overdemanded sets may not be suﬃcient for our purposes. Let I = {i,j,k,l} and
R = {a,b,c,d}. Suppose that the value matrix V and price p induce the following demands:
Di(p)=Dj(p)={a},D k(p)={b},D l(p)={a,b}
Here the only minimal overdemanded set is {a}. Nevertheless there is a clear ￿excess demand￿
for room b as well.
Motivated by this observation iteratively de￿ne the full set of overdemanded rooms at
price p as follows: Given p ￿nd all minimal overdemanded sets. Remove these rooms from the
demand of each agent and ￿nd the minimal overdemanded sets for the modi￿ed demand pro￿les.
Proceed in a similar way until there is no minimal overdemanded set for the modi￿ed demand
pro￿les. The full set of overdemanded rooms is the union of each of the sets encountered in the
procedure.
In the earlier example the singleton {a} is a minimal overdemanded set. Once room a is
removed from the demand of each agent we have Dk(p) \{ a} = Dl(p) \{ a} = {b} and hence
room b is also included in the full set of overdemanded rooms at price p.
Let OD(p) denote the full set of overdemanded rooms at price p. The following lemma will
be useful to de￿ne our auction.
6Lemma 1: Let p ∈ Rn.
OD(p)=∅⇐ ⇒
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ∪
i∈J
Di(p)
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ≥ |J| for all J ⊆ I
Proof :L e tp ∈ Rn and suppose that OD(p)=∅.B yd e ￿nition of OD(p) there is no minimal
overdemanded set at price p and thus there is no overdemanded set either. Then for each J ⊆ I
we have
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ∪
i∈J
Di(p)
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ≥ |J| for otherwise S = ∪
i∈J
Di(p) would be an overdemanded set.
Conversely suppose that for every J ⊆ I we have
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ∪
i∈J
Di(p)
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ≥ |J|. Then there are no
overdemanded sets and hence OD(p)=∅. ♦
3.2 The Continuous-Price Auction
We are now ready to propose an auction to ￿n da￿ m a r k e t ￿a l l o c a t i o n(￿,p) ∈ M￿P:
1. Set initially the price of each room to c/n. That is, set p =(c
n,..., c
n).
2. (a) If OD(p)=∅ then by Lemma 1 and Hall￿s Theorem there exists a matching ￿ such
that ￿i ∈ Di(p) for each agent i ∈ I. Terminate the procedure.
(b) If OD(p) 6= ∅ then continuously increase prices of all rooms in OD(p) equally by
dx → 0 and continuously decrease prices of all remaining rooms (i.e. rooms in
R\OD(p)) equally by dy → 0 such that |OD(p)|dx =( n−|OD(p)|)dy. This ensures
that summation of the prices of the rooms is equal to rent throughout the procedure.
(c) Return to beginning of Step 2 with the updated price vector.
Note that the auction procedure terminates when we reach a price vector p ∈ P with
OD(p)=∅. In the next section we show that our continuous-price auction converges.
4C o n v e r g e n c e
Let p ∈ P be a price vector that is obtained at an instant of our continuous-price auction.
De￿ne
J(p)={i ∈ I : Di(p) ⊆ OD(p)}.
That is, J(p) is the set of agents each of whom only demand rooms in the full set of overde-
manded rooms.
Lemma 2: For each p ∈ P with OD(p) 6= ∅ we have |J(p)| > |OD(p)|.
Proof: Let p ∈ P with OD(p) 6= ∅. Consider the construction of the full set of overdemanded
rooms. Let S1 be an arbitrary minimal overdemanded set and let J1 = {i ∈ I : Di(p) ⊆
7S1}.B y d e ￿nition we have S1 ⊆ OD(p) and |J1| > |S1|.I f S1 = OD(p) then we are done.
O t h e r w i s er e m o v er o o m si nS1 from the demand of each agent and let S2 be an arbitrary
minimal overdemanded set for the modi￿ed market. Let J2 = {i ∈ I : Di(p) \ S1 ⊆ S2}.N o t e
that J1 and J2 are disjoint sets. By de￿nition we have S2 ⊆ OD(p) and |J2| > |S2|. Proceeding
in a similar way we obtain |J(p)| = | ∪ Jk| > | ∪ Sk| = |OD(p)|. ♦
We next show that our auction converges. For this purpose we will prove the convergence
result
Theorem 1: The price path in the continuous price auction converges to a price p∗ ∈ P such
that OD(p∗)=∅.
Proof : Here is our proof strategy. Consider any two prices p and q in the price path of the

















i.e. this sum strictly decreases at each step as long as OD(p) is non-empty. Since this sum is
bounded from above by 0, this implies that (i) this sum will converge and (ii) there will be a
limit price p∗ such that OD(p∗)=∅ a n dw eo b t a i nt h ed e s i r e dc o n v e r g e n c er e s u l t .
Now consider the instance that continuous price auction reaches price p. Consider each agent
i such that there is a room r which she does not demand at price p. Hence e ui(p) >u i(r,pr).
By continuity of utility functions in pr we can ￿nd a suﬃciently small †>0 such that when
we increase the prices of rooms in OD(p) by
n−|OD(p)|
n † and decrease the price of rooms in
R\OD(p) by
|OD(p)|
n †, each agent continues to demand a room she was demanding at price p.




























P r o o fo ft h eC l a i m :L e tt ≥ 0 be such that OD(pt) 6= ∅. We consider agents in J(pt) and agents
in I \ J(pt) separately.
1. Let i ∈ J(pt) and a ∈ Di(pt). By construction of J(pt) we have a ∈ OD(pt) and by

































Next consider rooms in R \ Di(pt). We will show that ui(a,pt+1
a ) ≥ ui(r,pt+1
r ) for all
r ∈ R \ Di(pt) w h i c hi nt u r ns h o w st h a te ui(pp+1)=ui(a,pt+1
a ).W e c o n s i d e r r o o m s i n
R \ OD(pt) and rooms in OD(pt) \ Di(pt) separately.


































































a ) ≥ ui(r,pt+1
r ) for all r ∈ R \ OD(pt) by Relation 1.









































a ) ≥ ui(r,pt+1
r ) for all r ∈ OD(pt) \ Di(pt) as well.
9Therefore ui(a,pt+1
a ) ≥ ui(r,pt+1











2. Let i ∈ I\J(pt) and a ∈ Di(pt)\OD(pt).S i n c ei 6∈ J(pt), such a room necessarily exists.

































Next consider rooms in R \ Di(pt).L e tr ∈ R \ Di(pt). Since prices of rooms have either
decreased by |OD(pt)|
n x(pt) or increased by
n−|OD(pt)|





































a ) >u i(r,pt+1











We are now ready to complete the proof of the Claim which in turn completes the proof
o ft h et h e o r e m . B yL e m m a2w eh a v e|J(pt)| ≥ |OD(pt)| +1and |I\J(pt)| = n − |J(pt)| ≤



































































completing the proof of the Claim as well as the theorem. ♦
5E ﬃciency, Envy-Freeness and Individual Rationality
Eﬃciency and fairness often play key roles in evaluation of mechanisms for various resource
allocation problems. Envy-freeness (Foley [1967]) is widely considered the central notion of
fairness in the context of room assignment-rent division problems.
An allocation (￿,p) ∈ M￿Pis envy-free if and only if ui(￿i,p ￿i) ≥ ui(r,pr) for all i ∈ I
and r ∈ R.






ui(ηi,q ηi) for all η ∈ M and q ∈ P.








ηi for all η ∈ M. Therefore prices have no signi￿cance for eﬃciency considerations.
Proposition 1: An allocation (￿,p) ∈ M￿Pis envy-free if and only if ￿i ∈ Di(p) for each
agent i ∈ I.
Proof :L e t(￿,p) ∈ M￿P be such that ￿i ∈ Di(p) for each agent i ∈ I.T h e nui(￿i,p ￿i) ≥
ui(r,pr) for all i ∈ I and r ∈ R. Therefore (￿,p) is envy-free.
Conversely let (￿,p) ∈ M￿P be envy-free. Then ui(￿i,p ￿i) ≥ ui(r,p) for all i ∈ I and
r ∈ R. Therefore ￿i ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ I. ♦.
Corollary 1: The outcome of our auction is envy-free.
Svensson [1983] (????) shows that envy-freeness implies eﬃciency in the context of room
assignment-rent division problems.
11Proposition 2 (Svensson [1983]): Let (￿,p) ∈ M￿P be an envy-free allocation. Then
(￿,p) is eﬃcient.
Corollary 2: The outcome of our auction is eﬃcient.
Since our auction mimics the market mechanism, Corollary 2 can be interpreted as a First
Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics in the present context.
A mechanism should ensure that each agent receives a non-negative utility in order to
sustain the stability of its outcome. Otherwise agents may opt-out and receive their reservation
utilities each of which is 0.
An allocation (￿,p) ∈ M￿Pis individually rational if ui(￿i,p ￿i) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I.
Proposition 3: The outcome of our auction is individually rational.(??????)
Proof :L e t(￿,p) ∈ M￿P be the outcome of our auction. Suppose ui(￿i,p ￿i) < 0 for some
agent i ∈ I.S i n c e￿i ∈ Di(p) we have 0 >u i(￿i,p ￿i) ≥ ui(r,pr)=vi











r ≥ c for each agent i ∈ I
yielding the desired contradiction. ♦
6 Room Assignment-Rent Division with Quasi-Linear
Utilities
In this section, we will inspect the special case when utility functions of agents are quasi-linear
in money i.e. for each agent i ∈ I we have
ui(r,pr)=ui(r,0) − pr
for each room r and price pr. We will call ui(r,0) as the value of agent i for room r and denote
it by vi
r.
In this environment, we will de￿ne a discrete version of our continuous auction procedure,
and we will then prove that this auction ￿nds a positive envy-free price vector whenever one
exists.
In the continuous-price auction the only instances that are crucial are those instances where
some agent￿s demand changes. At these instances the full set of overdemanded rooms may
possibly change. Between two such instances prices of overdemanded rooms increase uniformly
and prices of the remaining rooms decrease uniformly in such a way that the sum of the prices
stay constant at c. This observation allows us to formulate the following discrete equivalent of
our continuous-price auction.
126.1 An Equivalent Discrete-Price Auction for Quasi-Linear Utilities
In order to introduce the discrete equivalent of our auction we need additional notation.
Let p0 be the ￿rst price vector obtained in the continuous-price auction after price p where
an agent￿s demand set gets larger. Such an agent is necessarily a member of J(p).T h a t i s
because (i) each agent in I \ J(p) demands a room in R \ OD(p) and prices of these rooms
have been falling uniformly, and (ii) utilities are quasi-linear in prices. Therefore the full set of













if OD(p) 6= ∅
0 if OD(p)=∅
Consider any pair of rooms r,s such that r ∈ OD(p) and s ∈ R\OD(p). The price diﬀerential
(pr−ps) increases at the same rate for any pair of such rooms until the full set of overdemanded
rooms changes. As we have already mentioned this may only happen when an agent in J(p)
demands a room in R \ OD(p) and x(p) is the minimum price diﬀerential needed for that to
happen. When price of room r ∈ OD(p) increases to pr +
n−|OD(p)|
n x(p) and price of room
s ∈ R\OD(p) reduces to ps −
|OD(p)|
n x(p), the price diﬀerential (pr −ps) reaches x(p).F o re a c h





n x(p) if r/ ∈ OD(p)
pr +
n−|OD(p)|
n x(p) if r ∈ OD(p)
By construction p0 =( fr(p))r∈R is the ￿rst price vector obtained in the continuous-price auction
where an agent￿s demand set gets larger. We are now ready to introduce the discrete equivalent
of our continuous-price auction:
Step 0: Set p0 =( c
n,..., c
n).I fOD(p0)=∅ then ￿nd a matching ￿ such that ￿i ∈ Di(p0) for
each i ∈ I, set p = p0 and terminate the procedure. If OD(p0) 6= ∅ then proceed to Step 1.
In general,
Step t: Set pt
r = fr(pt−1) for all r ∈ R.I f OD(pt)=∅ then ￿nd a matching ￿ such that
￿i ∈ Di(pt) for each i ∈ I, set p = pt and terminate the procedure. If OD(pt) 6= ∅ then proceed
to Step t+1.
Before we show that the discrete-price auction converges, we give a detailed example which
illustrates the dynamics of the discrete-price auction.
Example: Let the set of agents be I = {i1,i 2,i 3,i 4,i 5,i 6}, the set of rooms be R = {a,b,c,d,e,f},
13the valuation matrix be
V =
a b c d e f
i1 15 18 10 15 24 28
i2 18 25 3 18 25 15
i3 6 25 15 18 18 25
i4 18 5 18 12 9 25
i5 6 22 5 5 10 12
i6 6 9 2 21 25 9
and the rent be 60.
Step 0: p0 =( 1 0 ,10,10,10,10,10). In order to obtain the demand of each agent at p0,w e
shall ￿nd utilities of agents over rooms at p0. In the following utility matrix indirect utilities







a b c d e f
i1 5 8 0 5 14 18
i2 8 15 −7 8 15 5
i3 −4 15 5 8 8 15
i4 8 −5 8 2 −1 15
i5 −4 12 −5 −5 0 2
i6 −4 −1 −8 11 15 −1
Therefore the demand of each agent at p0 is as follows:
Di1(p0)={f} Di3(p0)={b,f} Di5(p0)={b}
Di2(p0)={b,e} Di4(p0)={f} Di6(p0)={e}
Next we ￿nd the full set of overdemanded rooms at p0:
Iteration 1: S1 = {f} is minimally overdemanded since each of the agents in J1 = {i1,i 4}
demand only room f. S1 is the unique minimal overdemanded set. Remove S1 from the
demand of each agent.
Iteration 2: S2 = {b} is minimally overdemanded once room f is removed from the demands.
That is because agents in J2 = {i3,i 5} demand only room b once room f is removed from the
demands. (That is, Di3(p0)\S1 = Di5(p0)\S1 = {b}.) S2 is the unique minimal overdemanded
set once room f is removed from the demands. Remove S2 from the demand of each agent.
Iteration 3: S3 = {e} is minimally overdemanded once rooms f, b are removed from the
demands. That is because agents in J3 = {i2,i 6} demand only room e once rooms f, b are
removed from the demands. S3 is the unique minimal overdemanded set once rooms f, b are
removed from the demands. Remove S3 from the demand of each agent.
Iteration 4: There are no minimal overdemanded sets once rooms f, b and e are removed from
demands.
Therefore OD(p0)=S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 = {b,e,f} and J(p0)=J1 ∪ J2 ∪ J3 = {i1,i 2,i 3,i 4,i 5,i 6}.
Since OD(p0) 6= ∅ w ep r o c e e dw i t hS t e p1 .
14Step 1: We determine p1 as follows: x(p0)=e ui6(p0)−ui6(d,p0
d)=1 5 −11 = 4 and |OD(p0)| =3 .







r +2 if r ∈ OD(p0)
p0
r − 2 otherwise







a b c d e f
i1 7 6 2 7 12 16
i2 10 13 −5 10 13 3
i3 −2 13 7 10 6 13
i4 10 −7 10 4 −3 13
i5 −2 10 −3 −3 −2 0
i6 −2 −3 −6 13 13 −3
Therefore the demand of each agent at p1 is as follows:
Di1(p0)={f} Di3(p0)={b,f} Di5(p0)={b}
Di2(p0)={b,e} Di4(p0)={f} Di6(p0)={d,e}
Next we ￿nd the full set of overdemanded rooms at p1:
Iteration 1: S1 = {f} is minimally overdemanded since each of the agents in J1 = {i1,i 4}
demand only room f. S1 is the unique minimal overdemanded set. Remove S1 from the
demand of each agent.
Iteration 2: S2 = {b} is minimally overdemanded once room f is removed from the demands.
That is because agents in J2 = {i3,i 5} demand only room b once room f is removed from
the demands. S2 is the unique minimal overdemanded set once room f is removed from the
demands. Remove S2 from the demand of each agent.
Iteration 3: There are no minimal overdemanded sets once rooms f and b are removed from
demands.
Therefore OD(p1)=S1∪S2 = {b,f} and J(p1)=J1∪J2 = {i1,i 3,i 4,i 5}.S i n c eOD(p1) 6= ∅
w ep r o c e e dw i t hS t e p2 .
Step 2: We determine p2 = f(p1) as follows: x(p1)=e ui3(p1) − ui3(d,p1
d)=1 3− 10 = 3 and







r +2 if r ∈ OD(p1)
p1
r − 1 otherwise







a b c d e f
i1 8 4 3 8 13 14
i2 11 11 −4 11 14 1
i3 −1 11 8 11 7 11
i4 11 −9 11 5 −2 11
i5 −1 8 −2 −2 −1 −2
i6 −1 −5 −5 14 14 −5
Therefore the demand of each agent at p2 is as follows:
Di1(p0)={f} Di3(p0)={b,d,f} Di5(p0)={b}
Di2(p0)={e} Di4(p0)={a,c,f} Di6(p0)={d,e}
Next we ￿nd the full set of overdemanded rooms at p2:
Iteration 1: S4 = {b,d,e,f} is minimally overdemanded since each of the agents in J4 =
{i1,i 2,i 3,i 5,i 6} demands only rooms from S4. S4 is the unique minimal overdemanded set.
Remove S4 from the demand of each agent.
Iteration 2: There are no minimal overdemanded sets once rooms b, d, e,a n df are removed
from demands.
Therefore OD(p2)=S4 = {b,d,e,f} and J(p2)=J4 = {i1,i 2,i 3,i 5,i 6}.S i n c eOD(p2) 6= ∅
w ep r o c e e dw i t hS t e p3 .
Step 3: We determine p3 as follows: x(p2)=e ui3(p2)−ui3(c,p2
c)=1 4 −11 = 3 and |OD(p2)| =4 .







r +1 if r ∈ OD(p2)
p2
r − 2 otherwise







a b c d e f
i1 10 3 5 7 12 13
i2 13 10 −2 10 13 0
i3 1 10 10 10 6 10
i4 13 −10 13 4 −3 10
i5 1 7 0 −3 −2 −3
i6 1 −6 −1 13 13 −6
Therefore the demand of each agent at p3 is as follows:
Di1(p0)={f} Di3(p0)={b,c,d,f} Di5(p0)={b}
Di2(p0)={a,e} Di4(p0)={a,c} Di6(p0)={d,e}
Next we ￿nd the full set of overdemanded rooms at p3:
16Iteration 1: There are no minimal overdemanded sets.
Therefore OD(p3)=∅ and hence we terminate the procedure. We have ￿i ∈ Di(p3) for all
i ∈ I for
￿ ∈ {￿1,￿ 2} =
‰￿





i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6
fadcbe
¶￿
and therefore either of the allocations (￿1,p 3) or (￿2,p 3) c a nb eo b t a i n e da sa no u t c o m eo fo u r
auction.⁄
In the continuous-price auction the only instances that are crucial are those instances where
some agent￿s demand changes. At these instances the full set of overdemanded rooms may
possibly change. Between two such instances prices of overdemanded rooms increase uniformly
and prices of the remaining rooms decrease uniformly in such a way that the sum of the prices
stay constant at c. This observation allows us to formulate the following discrete equivalent of
our continuous-price auction.
6.2 An Equivalent Discrete-Price Auction
In order to introduce the discrete equivalent of our auction we need additional notation.
Let p ∈ P be a price vector that is obtained at an instant of our continuous-price auction.
De￿ne
J(p)={i ∈ I : Di(p) ⊆ OD(p)}.
That is, J(p) is the set of agents each of whom only demand rooms in the full set of overde-
manded rooms.
Lemma 2: For each p ∈ P with OD(p) 6= ∅ we have |J(p)| > |OD(p)|.
Proof: Let p ∈ P with OD(p) 6= ∅. Consider the construction of the full set of overdemanded
rooms. Let S1 be an arbitrary minimal overdemanded set and let J1 = {i ∈ I : Di(p) ⊆
S1}.B y d e ￿nition we have S1 ⊆ OD(p) and |J1| > |S1|.I f S1 = OD(p) then we are done.
O t h e r w i s er e m o v er o o m si nS1 from the demand of each agent and let S2 be an arbitrary
minimal overdemanded set for the modi￿ed market. Let J2 = {i ∈ I : Di(p) \ S1 ⊆ S2}.N o t e
that J1 and J2 are disjoint sets. By de￿nition we have S2 ⊆ OD(p) and |J2| > |S2|. Proceeding
in a similar way we obtain |J(p)| = | ∪ Jk| > | ∪ Sk| = |OD(p)|. ♦
Let p0 be the ￿rst price vector obtained in the continuous-price auction after price p where
an agent￿s demand set gets larger. Such an agent is necessarily a member of J(p).T h a t i s
because (i) each agent in I \ J(p) demands a room in R \ OD(p) and prices of these rooms
have been falling uniformly, and (ii) utilities are quasi-linear in prices. Therefore the full set of













if OD(p) 6= ∅
0 if OD(p)=∅
Consider any pair of rooms r,s such that r ∈ OD(p) and s ∈ R\OD(p). The price diﬀerential
(pr−ps) increases at the same rate for any pair of such rooms until the full set of overdemanded
rooms changes. As we have already mentioned this may only happen when an agent in J(p)
demands a room in R \ OD(p) and x(p) is the minimum price diﬀerential needed for that to
happen. When price of room r ∈ OD(p) increases to pr +
n−|OD(p)|
n x(p) and price of room
s ∈ R\OD(p) reduces to ps −
|OD(p)|
n x(p), the price diﬀerential (pr −ps) reaches x(p).F o re a c h





n x(p) if r/ ∈ OD(p)
pr +
n−|OD(p)|
n x(p) if r ∈ OD(p)
By construction p0 =( fr(p))r∈R is the ￿rst price vector obtained in the continuous-price auction
where an agent￿s demand set gets larger. We are now ready to introduce the discrete equivalent
of our continuous-price auction:
Step 0: Set p0 =( c
n,..., c
n).I fOD(p0)=∅ then ￿nd a matching ￿ such that ￿i ∈ Di(p0) for
each i ∈ I, set p = p0 and terminate the procedure. If OD(p0) 6= ∅ then proceed to Step 1.
In general,
Step t: Set pt
r = fr(pt−1) for all r ∈ R.I f OD(pt)=∅ then ￿nd a matching ￿ such that
￿i ∈ Di(pt) for each i ∈ I, set p = pt and terminate the procedure. If OD(pt) 6= ∅ then proceed
to Step t+1.
Before we show that the discrete-price auction converges, we give a detailed example which
illustrates the dynamics of the discrete-price auction.
Example: Let the set of agents be I = {i1,i 2,i 3,i 4,i 5,i 6}, the set of rooms be R = {a,b,c,d,e,f},
the valuation matrix be
V =
a b c d e f
i1 15 18 10 15 24 28
i2 18 25 3 18 25 15
i3 6 25 15 18 18 25
i4 18 5 18 12 9 25
i5 6 22 5 5 10 12
i6 6 9 2 21 25 9
and the rent be 60.
Step 0: p0 =( 1 0 ,10,10,10,10,10). In order to obtain the demand of each agent at p0,w e
shall ￿nd utilities of agents over rooms at p0. In the following utility matrix indirect utilities







a b c d e f
i1 5 8 0 5 14 18
i2 8 15 −7 8 15 5
i3 −4 15 5 8 8 15
i4 8 −5 8 2 −1 15
i5 −4 12 −5 −5 0 2
i6 −4 −1 −8 11 15 −1
Therefore the demand of each agent at p0 is as follows:
Di1(p0)={f} Di3(p0)={b,f} Di5(p0)={b}
Di2(p0)={b,e} Di4(p0)={f} Di6(p0)={e}
Next we ￿nd the full set of overdemanded rooms at p0:
Iteration 1: S1 = {f} is minimally overdemanded since each of the agents in J1 = {i1,i 4}
demand only room f. S1 is the unique minimal overdemanded set. Remove S1 from the
demand of each agent.
Iteration 2: S2 = {b} is minimally overdemanded once room f is removed from the demands.
That is because agents in J2 = {i3,i 5} demand only room b once room f is removed from the
demands. (That is, Di3(p0)\S1 = Di5(p0)\S1 = {b}.) S2 is the unique minimal overdemanded
set once room f is removed from the demands. Remove S2 from the demand of each agent.
Iteration 3: S3 = {e} is minimally overdemanded once rooms f, b are removed from the
demands. That is because agents in J3 = {i2,i 6} demand only room e once rooms f, b are
removed from the demands. S3 is the unique minimal overdemanded set once rooms f, b are
removed from the demands. Remove S3 from the demand of each agent.
Iteration 4: There are no minimal overdemanded sets once rooms f, b and e are removed from
demands.
Therefore OD(p0)=S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 = {b,e,f} and J(p0)=J1 ∪ J2 ∪ J3 = {i1,i 2,i 3,i 4,i 5,i 6}.
Since OD(p0) 6= ∅ w ep r o c e e dw i t hS t e p1 .
Step 1: We determine p1 as follows: x(p0)=e ui6(p0)−ui6(d,p0
d)=1 5 −11 = 4 and |OD(p0)| =3 .







r +2 if r ∈ OD(p0)
p0
r − 2 otherwise







a b c d e f
i1 7 6 2 7 12 16
i2 10 13 −5 10 13 3
i3 −2 13 7 10 6 13
i4 10 −7 10 4 −3 13
i5 −2 10 −3 −3 −2 0
i6 −2 −3 −6 13 13 −3
Therefore the demand of each agent at p1 is as follows:
Di1(p0)={f} Di3(p0)={b,f} Di5(p0)={b}
Di2(p0)={b,e} Di4(p0)={f} Di6(p0)={d,e}
Next we ￿nd the full set of overdemanded rooms at p1:
Iteration 1: S1 = {f} is minimally overdemanded since each of the agents in J1 = {i1,i 4}
demand only room f. S1 is the unique minimal overdemanded set. Remove S1 from the
demand of each agent.
Iteration 2: S2 = {b} is minimally overdemanded once room f is removed from the demands.
That is because agents in J2 = {i3,i 5} demand only room b once room f is removed from
the demands. S2 is the unique minimal overdemanded set once room f is removed from the
demands. Remove S2 from the demand of each agent.
Iteration 3: There are no minimal overdemanded sets once rooms f and b are removed from
demands.
Therefore OD(p1)=S1∪S2 = {b,f} and J(p1)=J1∪J2 = {i1,i 3,i 4,i 5}.S i n c eOD(p1) 6= ∅
w ep r o c e e dw i t hS t e p2 .
Step 2: We determine p2 = f(p1) as follows: x(p1)=e ui3(p1) − ui3(d,p1
d)=1 3− 10 = 3 and







r +2 if r ∈ OD(p1)
p1
r − 1 otherwise







a b c d e f
i1 8 4 3 8 13 14
i2 11 11 −4 11 14 1
i3 −1 11 8 11 7 11
i4 11 −9 11 5 −2 11
i5 −1 8 −2 −2 −1 −2
i6 −1 −5 −5 14 14 −5
20Therefore the demand of each agent at p2 is as follows:
Di1(p0)={f} Di3(p0)={b,d,f} Di5(p0)={b}
Di2(p0)={e} Di4(p0)={a,c,f} Di6(p0)={d,e}
Next we ￿nd the full set of overdemanded rooms at p2:
Iteration 1: S4 = {b,d,e,f} is minimally overdemanded since each of the agents in J4 =
{i1,i 2,i 3,i 5,i 6} demands only rooms from S4. S4 is the unique minimal overdemanded set.
Remove S4 from the demand of each agent.
Iteration 2: There are no minimal overdemanded sets once rooms b, d, e,a n df are removed
from demands.
Therefore OD(p2)=S4 = {b,d,e,f} and J(p2)=J4 = {i1,i 2,i 3,i 5,i 6}.S i n c eOD(p2) 6= ∅
w ep r o c e e dw i t hS t e p3 .
Step 3: We determine p3 as follows: x(p2)=e ui3(p2)−ui3(c,p2
c)=1 4 −11 = 3 and |OD(p2)| =4 .







r +1 if r ∈ OD(p2)
p2
r − 2 otherwise







a b c d e f
i1 10 3 5 7 12 13
i2 13 10 −2 10 13 0
i3 1 10 10 10 6 10
i4 13 −10 13 4 −3 10
i5 1 7 0 −3 −2 −3
i6 1 −6 −1 13 13 −6
Therefore the demand of each agent at p3 is as follows:
Di1(p0)={f} Di3(p0)={b,c,d,f} Di5(p0)={b}
Di2(p0)={a,e} Di4(p0)={a,c} Di6(p0)={d,e}
Next we ￿nd the full set of overdemanded rooms at p3:
Iteration 1: There are no minimal overdemanded sets.
Therefore OD(p3)=∅ and hence we terminate the procedure. We have ￿i ∈ Di(p3) for all
i ∈ I for
￿ ∈ {￿1,￿ 2} =
‰￿





i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6
fadcbe
¶￿
and therefore either of the allocations (￿1,p 3) or (￿2,p 3) c a nb eo b t a i n e da sa no u t c o m eo fo u r
auction.⁄
21An important diﬃculty about envy-freeness is that for some problems at least one of the
prices is negative at each envy-free allocation: For example let I = {i,j}, R = {a,b}, c =1 0





b)=( 1 5 ,1). Here, even if pa = c =1 0and pb =0 ,
both agents still prefer room a to room b. We shall have pa =1 2and pb = −2 in order to
ensure envy-freeness.
Brams & Kilgour [2001] give up envy-freeness based on this diﬃculty and their mechanism
always gives non-negative prices. A disadvantage of their mechanism is that it may still choose
envious allocations even though there exists envy-free allocations with non-negative prices.
We believe that cases like the earlier example are rather unlikely in real-life applications by
the nature of the problem. It is unlikely that agents i and j will jointly rent this house when
both are eager to pay more than the rent for room a and almost nothing for room b.I nt h i s
case whoever has the lease will most likely ￿nd another roommate or rent the house alone.
Haake, Raith & Su [2001] insist on envy-freeness but their mechanism may yield negative
prices even though there exists envy-free allocations with non-negative prices. By Corollary 1
our auction is envy-free as well. Therefore it admits negative prices if there exists no envy-
free allocation with non-negative prices. However unlike the mechanism of Haake, Raith & Su
[2001], our auction mechanism yields an envy-free allocation with non-negative prices whenever
such an allocation exists. We shall introduce a related model and relate our auction to the
well-known auction of Demange, Gale & Sotomayor [1986] in order to prove this result.
6.3 A Two-Sided Matching Model
We next turn our attention to a two-sided matching model analyzed by Demage, Gale &
Sotomayor [1986].1
Let I = {i1,...,i n} be a set of buyers and R = {r1,...,r n} be a set of objects. Each buyer
has use for one and only one object and V =[ vi
r]i∈I,r∈R is a value matrix where vi
r ≥ 0 denotes
the value of object r for buyer i.
Am a t c h i n g￿ is an assignment of objects to buyers such that each buyer is assigned one
and only one object. A price is a vector p ∈ Rn. Let the reservation price of each object be
0. Therefore in the present context we only consider non-negative prices. Each buyer i ∈ I is




Note that the key diﬀerence between the two models is the following: The prices shall add
up to c in room assignment-rent division problems whereas the only constraint in the present
1See Roth & Sotomayor [1990] for an extensive survey of two-sided matching models.
22two-sided matching model is that the price of each object shall be non-negative (i.e. no less
than its reservation price).
As in the case of room assignment-rent division problems, the demand of buyer i ∈ I at
price p ∈ Rn
+ is given by
Di(p)={r ∈ R : ui(r,pr) ≥ ui(s,ps) for all s ∈ R}.
Given a price p ∈ Rn, notions of overdemanded set, minimal overdemanded set, full set of
overdemanded objects and the price diﬀerential x(p) are de￿ned as in room assignment-rent
division problems. The price p ∈ Rn
+ is competitive if there exists a matching ￿ such that
￿i ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ I. The pair (￿,p) is refereed as a competitive equilibrium. Shapley
& Shubik [1972] show that competitive equilibria always exist and there exists a competitive
price p ∈ Rn
+ such that pr ≤ qr for all r ∈ R and for any competitive price q ∈ Rn
+.W er e f e rp
as the buyer-optimal competitive price.
6.4 Demange, Gale & Sotomayor Exact Auction
Demange, Gale & Sotomayor [1986] assumes that the value matrix is integer valued and provides
the following auction which yields the buyer-optimal competitive price.
Step 0: Set p0 =( 0 ,...,0). If there exists no minimal overdemanded set at p0 then ￿nd a
matching ￿ such that ￿i ∈ Di(p0) for each i ∈ I,s e tpDGS = p0 and terminate the procedure.
Otherwise proceed to Step 1.
In general,
Step t: Pick an arbitrary minimal overdemanded set S at price pt−1.L e t pt
r = pt−1
r +1for
each r ∈ S and let pt
r = pt−1
r for each r ∈ R \ S. If there exists no minimal overdemanded set
at pt then ￿nd a matching ￿ such that ￿i ∈ Di(pt) for each i ∈ I, set pDGS = pt and terminate
the procedure. Otherwise proceed to Step t+1.
We refer this auction as DGS exact auction.
Theorem (Demange, Gale & Sotomayor): DGS exact auction yields the buyer-optimal
competitive price.
While Demange, Gale & Sotomayor [1986] assumes that valuations are integer valued, it is
straightforward to extend their auction as well as their result for real-valued valuations.
236.5 The Modi￿ed Discrete-Price Auction
Consider the following price updating rule at any price q ∈ Rn
+: Construct the full set of












if OD(q) 6= ∅
0 if OD(q)=∅
For any r ∈ R de￿ne
gr(q)=
‰
qr if r 6∈ OD(q)
qr + x(q) if r ∈ OD(q)
We are now ready to de￿ne the modi￿ed discrete-price auction which will be key to relate
our discrete-price auction (and hence our continuous-price auction as well) with DGS exact
auction.
Step 0: Set q0 =( 0 ,...,0).I fOD(q0)=∅ then ￿nd a matching ￿ such that ￿i ∈ Di(q0) for
each i ∈ I, set q = q0 and terminate the procedure. If OD(q0) 6= ∅ then proceed to Step 1.
In general,
Step t: Set qt
r = gr(qt−1) for all r ∈ R.I f OD(qt)=∅ then ￿nd a matching ￿ such that
￿i ∈ Di(qt) for each i ∈ I,s e tq = qt and terminate the procedure. If OD(qt) 6= ∅ then proceed
to Step t+1.
We need the following lemma in order to relate the modi￿ed discrete-price auction and the
discrete-price auction.
Lemma 3: Let p,q ∈ Rn be such that pr = qr + k for all r ∈ R and some k ∈ R.T h e n
1. D(q)=D(p) and
2. x(q)=x(p).
Proof :F i x p,q ∈ Rn and k ∈ R such that pr = qr + k for all r ∈ R. Since utilities are
quasi-linear in prices, we have ui(r,pr)=vi
r − pr = vi
r − (qr + k)=ui(r,qr) − k for all i ∈ I
and r ∈ R.
1. Fix i ∈ I.F o ra n yr ∈ R we have
r ∈ Di(p) ⇐⇒ ui(r,pr) ≥ ui(s,ps) for all s ∈ R
⇐⇒ v
i
r − pr ≥ v
i
s − ps for all s ∈ R
⇐⇒ v
i
r − qr ≥ v
i
s − qs for all s ∈ R
⇐⇒ ui(r,qr) ≥ ui(s,qs) for all s ∈ R
⇐⇒ r ∈ Di(q)
and hence Di(p)=Di(q).S i n c ei ∈ I is arbitrary we have D(p)=D(q).
242. Since D(p)=D(q) we have OD(p)=OD(q), J(p)=J(q) and e ui(p)=e ui(q) − k for all










































We are ready to relate the modi￿ed discrete-price auction and the discrete-price auction.
Next we will relate the modi￿ed discrete-price auction and DGS exact auction clarifying the
relation between our discrete-price auction and DGS exact auction.
Proposition 4: Let {pt}T
t=0 be the price sequence obtained by the discrete price auction and
{qt} be the price sequence obtained by the modi￿ed discrete-price auction. Then the modi￿ed












for all r ∈ R.
Proof :L e t{pt}T
t=0 be the price sequence obtained by the discrete price auction and {qt} be the
price sequence obtained by the modi￿ed discrete-price auction.










n for all r ∈ R,
(ii) x(qt)=x(pt),a n d
(iii) D(qt)=D(pt).
P r o o fo ft h eC l a i m : We will prove the claim by induction. By construction of the modi￿ed






|OD(pu)|x(pu)=0for t =0 ,
Claim (i) holds for t =0 . Moreover by Lemma 3 we have D(q0)=D(p0) and x(q0)=x(p0).
Hence the Claim holds for t =0 .
25Next assume that 0 ≤ t∗ ≤ T and the Claim holds for t<t ∗.W es h a l lp r o v et h a tt h eC l a i m
holds for t = t∗ as well. First note that the assumption ensures that OD(qt)=OD(pt) 6= ∅ for
any t<t ∗. Moreover by construction of the price updating rule gr and since the Claim holds







r + x(qt∗−1) if r ∈ OD(qt∗−1)
qt∗−1
r if r 6∈ OD(qt∗−1)
=
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   


















n if r 6∈ OD(pt∗−1)
=
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   









































n x(pt∗−1) if r ∈ OD(pt∗−1)
pt∗−1
r − |OD(pt∗−1)|












and hence Claim (i) holds for t = t∗. Moreover by Lemma 3 we have D(qt∗)=D(pt∗) as well
as x(qt∗)=x(pt∗) completing the proof of the Claim. ♦







By the Claim we have qT
r = pT
r + σ−c




s = c imply






































26showing the desired equality. Moreover by the Claim we have D(qT)=D(pT) and therefore
OD(pT)=∅ implies OD(qT)=∅. Hence the modi￿ed discrete-price auction converges in T
s t e p sa sw e l l . ♦
6.6 Equivalence of DGS Exact Auction and the Modi￿ed Discrete
Price Auction
We are now ready to relate the modi￿ed discrete-price auction and DGS exact auction: Both
auctions yield the buyer-optimal competitive price.
Proposition 5: Let {qt}T
t=0 be the price sequence obtained by the modi￿ed discrete-price
auction and let pDGS be the ￿nal price obtained by DGS exact auction. We have qT = pDGS.
Proof : We will consider a general format of DGS exact auction where prices of rooms in a
minimal overdemanded set are increased by a suﬃciently small increment. Let {qt}T
t=0 be the
price sequence obtained by the modi￿ed discrete-price auction. Recall that initial price vector
is (0,...,0) for the modi￿ed discrete-price auction as wella sD G Se x a c ta u c t i o n .W ew i l ls h o w
that by an appropriate choice of
1. the order of minimal overdemanded sets and
2. the price increments,
price q1 can be reached by DGS exact auction. Iteration of the same argument shows that
prices q2,...,qT can as well be reached by DGS exact price auction. Once qT has been reached,
OD(qT)=∅ implies that there exists no minimal overdemanded set and hence DGS exact
auction terminates yielding pDGS = qT.
For any p ∈ Rn, recall the construction of OD(p):W e￿nd all minimal overdemanded sets.
We remove these rooms from the demand of each agent and ￿nd the minimal overdemanded
sets for the modi￿ed demand pro￿les. We proceed in a similar way until there exists no minimal
overdemanded set for the modi￿ed demand pro￿les. The full set of overdemanded rooms OD(p)
is the union of each of the sets encountered in the procedure.
For p = q0 =( 0 ,...,0) let S1
1,...,S1
m1 be minimal overdemanded sets, let S2
1,...,S2
m2
be minimal overdemanded sets once
Sm1
α=1 S1
α has been removed from the demands,...,l e t
Sk
1,...,Sk








removed from the demands. De￿ne
y(q






















27Pick an integer ‘0 such that
x(q0)
‘0 <y (q0) and let †0 =
x(q0)
‘0 . The following pair of observations
will be key to our proof.
Observation 1: Consider an increase in some of the prices while the remaining prices stay put.
A minimal overdemanded set S remains minimal overdemanded provided that prices of the
rooms in S stay put.
Observation 2: Suppose prices of all rooms in
Sm1
α=1 S1
α increase by †0 and the remaining prices
stay put. Then each of S2
1,...,S2
m2 become a minimal overdemanded set at updated prices.







increase by †0 while the remaining prices stay
put then each of S3
1,...,S3
m3 become a minimal overdemanded set at updated prices, and so
on.
Consider DGS exact price auction and initially set the price at p = q0 =( 0 ,...,0): S1
1 is a
minimal overdemanded set, increase prices of all rooms in S1
1 by †0.N e x tc o n s i d e rS1
2 which was
a minimal overdemanded set at q0 and which remains a minimal overdemanded set at updated
prices by Observation 1. Increase prices of all rooms in S1
2 by †0 as well. Similarly consider each
of the sets S1
3,...,S1
m1 one at a time and increase prices of all rooms in these sets by †0 one set
at a time. At this point prices of all rooms in each of the minimally overdemanded sets at q0 is
increased by †0 and by Observation 2 each of S2
1,...,S2
m2 became a minimally overdemanded
set at the updated prices. Similarly consider each of the sets S2
1,...,S2
m2 one at a time and
increase prices of all rooms in these sets by †0 one set at a time. Following in a similar way we
will reach a price vector p via DGS exact auction where pr = †0 for r ∈ OD(q0) and pr =0for
r 6∈ OD(q0).
Here the key observation is the following: Since †0 <x (q0) and since the price of each
room in OD(q0) has only increased by †0 we have OD(p)=OD(q0). (Recall that x(q0) is the
minimum price diﬀerential needed for the full set of overdemanded rooms to change). Therefore
we can replicate the same sequence of price increases ‘0−1 additional times through DGS exact
auction. When we do that we reach to a price p with pr = ‘0†0 = x(q0)=q1
r for each r ∈ OD(q0)
and pr =0=q1
r for each r 6∈ OD(q0). Hence we reach p = q1 via DGS exact auction.
Next construct OD(q1),d e ￿ne
y(q









let the integer ‘1 be such that
x(q1)
‘1 <y (q1) and let †1 =
x(q1)
‘1 . Iterating the earlier arguments
we can ￿rst increase prices of all rooms in OD(q1) by †1 and replicate this an additional ‘1 −1
times to reach p = q2 via DGS exact auction. Proceeding in a similar way we can reach p = qT
via DGS exact auction. Once we reach p = qT,s i n c eOD(qT)=∅ there are no minimal
overdemanded sets and hence DGS exact auction terminates. Therefore qT = pDGS. ♦
286.7 If There are Envy-Free Allocations at Non-Negative Prices Then
Our Auction Will Find One
We are ￿nally ready to show that if there exists envy-free allocations with non-negative prices,
then our auction yields such an allocation.
Theorem 2: Let (￿,p) ∈ M￿Pbe the outcome of our continuous-price auction (or equiva-
lently the discrete-price auction). We have pr ≥ 0 for all r ∈ R if and only if there exists an
envy-free allocation with non-negative prices.
Proof :L e thI,R,V,ci be a room assignment-rent division problem and let (￿,p) ∈ M￿Pbe
the outcome of our continuous-price auction. By Corollary 1, (￿,p) is envy-free and therefore
the only if part of the theorem holds immediately.
Conversely suppose that there exists an envy-free allocation (η,q) ∈ M￿P with qr ≥ 0
for all r ∈ R. Consider the two-sided matching market hI,R,Vi.B y P r o p o s i t i o n 1 w e h a v e
ηi ∈ Di(q) for all i ∈ I and therefore q is a competitive price. Let qT be the price obtained by
the modi￿ed discrete-price auction and let pDGS be the price obtained by DGS exact auction.
By Proposition 5 we have pDGS = qT and since pDGS is the buyer optimal competitive price we
have qT



















for all r ∈ R and therefore pT
r ≥ qT
r ≥ 0 for all r ∈ R completing the proof. ♦
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we propose an eﬃcient auction for room assignment-rent division problems. Our
auction is inspired by the market mechanism and it has two key advantages over existing
mechanisms: (i) it￿s outcome is always envy-free and (ii) it yields non-negative prices unless
there exists no envy-free allocation with non-negative prices. Based on these properties we
believe our auction mechanism can be used in real-life applications.
An important limitation of our mechanism is it￿s vulnerability to strategic preference ma-
nipulation.2 That is, our mechanism is not strategy-proof. Alkan, Demange & Gale [1991]
show that there exists no mechanism which is both envy-free and strategy-proof.3 Hence one
2The market mechanism is typically vulnerable to preference manipulation in most resource allocation prob-
lems. An important exception was shown by Roth [1982] in the context of housing markets (Shapley & Scarf
[1974]).
3It is possible to construct strategy-proof mechanisms by giving up envy-freeness. For example one can
￿xar e n td i v i s i o n ,￿x an initial matching to be interpreted as an initial endowment and ￿nd the competitive
allocation of the induced housing market. See Miyagawa [2001] and Svensson & Larsson [2000] for a similar
approach in housing markets with monetary transfers.
29cannot insist on both envy-freeness and strategy-proofness. Analyzing equilibria of preference
manipulation games induced by our auction mechanism is an important and interesting exercise
b u tt h i si sb e y o n dt h es c o p eo ft h ec u r r e n tp a p e r .
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